Struct webpki::EndEntityCert
source · pub struct EndEntityCert<'a> {
inner: Cert<'a>,
}
Expand description
An end-entity certificate.
Server certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of several steps. All of these steps are necessary:
-
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert
: Verify that the server’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS server. -
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_subject_name
: Verify that the server’s certificate is valid for the host or IP address that is being connected to. -
EndEntityCert.verify_signature
: Verify that the signature of server’sServerKeyExchange
message is valid for the server’s certificate.
Client certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of analogous steps. All of these steps are necessary:
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert
: Verify that the client’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS client.EndEntityCert.verify_signature
: Verify that the client’s signature in itsCertificateVerify
message is valid using the public key from the client’s certificate.
Although it would be less error-prone to combine all these steps into a
single function call, some significant optimizations are possible if the
three steps are processed separately (in parallel). It does not matter much
which order the steps are done in, but all of these steps must completed
before application data is sent and before received application data is
processed. EndEntityCert::from
is an inexpensive operation and is
deterministic, so if these tasks are done in multiple threads, it is
probably best to just call EndEntityCert::from
multiple times (before each
operation) for the same DER-encoded ASN.1 certificate bytes.
Fields§
§inner: Cert<'a>
Implementations§
source§impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
pub(crate) fn inner(&self) -> &Cert<'_>
fn verify_is_valid_cert( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], trust_anchors: &[TrustAnchor<'_>], intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time, eku: KeyUsage, crls: &[&dyn CertRevocationList], ) -> Result<(), Error>
sourcepub fn verify_for_usage(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
trust_anchors: &[TrustAnchor<'_>],
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time,
usage: KeyUsage,
crls: &[&dyn CertRevocationList],
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_for_usage( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], trust_anchors: &[TrustAnchor<'_>], intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time, usage: KeyUsage, crls: &[&dyn CertRevocationList], ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use against the specified Extended Key Usage (EKU).
supported_sig_algs
is the list of signature algorithms that are trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s public key is not validated against this list.trust_anchors
is the list of root CAs to trustintermediate_certs
is the sequence of intermediate certificates that the server sent in the TLS handshake.time
is the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current time).usage
is the intended usage of the certificate, indicating what kind of usage we’re verifying the certificate for.crls
is the list of certificate revocation lists to check the certificate against.
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
TlsServerTrustAnchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time,
) -> Result<(), Error>
👎Deprecated since 0.101.2: The per-usage trust anchor representations and verification functions are deprecated in favor of the general-purpose TrustAnchor
type and EndEntity::verify_for_usage
function. The new verify_for_usage
function expresses trust anchor and end entity purpose with the key usage argument.
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], TlsServerTrustAnchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time, ) -> Result<(), Error>
TrustAnchor
type and EndEntity::verify_for_usage
function. The new verify_for_usage
function expresses trust anchor and end entity purpose with the key usage argument.Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS server.
supported_sig_algs
is the list of signature algorithms that are
trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s
public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors
is the
list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs
is the sequence of
intermediate certificates that the server sent in the TLS handshake.
time
is the time for which the validation is effective (usually the
current time).
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert(
&self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
TlsClientTrustAnchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>,
intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
time: Time,
crls: &[&dyn CertRevocationList],
) -> Result<(), Error>
👎Deprecated since 0.101.2: The per-usage trust anchor representations and verification functions are deprecated in favor of the general-purpose TrustAnchor
type and EndEntity::verify_for_usage
function. The new verify_for_usage
function expresses trust anchor and end entity purpose with the key usage argument.
pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert( &self, supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm], TlsClientTrustAnchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>, intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]], time: Time, crls: &[&dyn CertRevocationList], ) -> Result<(), Error>
TrustAnchor
type and EndEntity::verify_for_usage
function. The new verify_for_usage
function expresses trust anchor and end entity purpose with the key usage argument.Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS client.
supported_sig_algs
is the list of signature algorithms that are
trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s
public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors
is the
list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs
is the sequence of
intermediate certificates that the client sent in the TLS handshake.
cert
is the purported end-entity certificate of the client. time
is
the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current
time).
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_for_subject_name(
&self,
subject_name: SubjectNameRef<'_>,
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_is_valid_for_subject_name( &self, subject_name: SubjectNameRef<'_>, ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies that the certificate is valid for the given Subject Name.
sourcepub fn verify_signature(
&self,
signature_alg: &SignatureAlgorithm,
msg: &[u8],
signature: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_signature( &self, signature_alg: &SignatureAlgorithm, msg: &[u8], signature: &[u8], ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies the signature signature
of message msg
using the
certificate’s public key.
signature_alg
is the algorithm to use to
verify the signature; the certificate’s public key is verified to be
compatible with this algorithm.
For TLS 1.2, signature
corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.signature
and signature_alg
corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.algorithm
of TLS type SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
. In
TLS 1.2 a single SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
may map to multiple
SignatureAlgorithm
s. For example, a TLS 1.2
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
of (ECDSA, SHA-256) may map to any or all
of {ECDSA_P256_SHA256
, ECDSA_P384_SHA256
}, depending on how the TLS
implementation is configured.
For current TLS 1.3 drafts, signature_alg
corresponds to TLS’s
algorithm
fields of type SignatureScheme
. There is (currently) a
one-to-one correspondence between TLS 1.3’s SignatureScheme
and
SignatureAlgorithm
.
sourcepub fn dns_names(
&'a self,
) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = GeneralDnsNameRef<'a>>, Error>
pub fn dns_names( &'a self, ) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = GeneralDnsNameRef<'a>>, Error>
Returns a list of the DNS names provided in the subject alternative names extension
This function must not be used to implement custom DNS name verification.
Verification functions are already provided as verify_is_valid_for_dns_name
and verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name
.