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use std::fmt;
use crate::anchors::{OwnedTrustAnchor, RootCertStore};
use crate::client::ServerName;
use crate::enums::SignatureScheme;
use crate::error::{
CertRevocationListError, CertificateError, Error, InvalidMessage, PeerMisbehaved,
};
use crate::key::{Certificate, ParsedCertificate};
#[cfg(feature = "logging")]
use crate::log::{debug, trace, warn};
use crate::msgs::base::PayloadU16;
use crate::msgs::codec::{Codec, Reader};
use crate::msgs::handshake::DistinguishedName;
use ring::digest::Digest;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::SystemTime;
type SignatureAlgorithms = &'static [&'static webpki::SignatureAlgorithm];
/// Which signature verification mechanisms we support. No particular
/// order.
static SUPPORTED_SIG_ALGS: SignatureAlgorithms = &[
&webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
&webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA384,
&webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA256,
&webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA384,
&webpki::ED25519,
&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY,
&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY,
&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY,
&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384,
&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512,
&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384,
];
// Marker types. These are used to bind the fact some verification
// (certificate chain or handshake signature) has taken place into
// protocol states. We use this to have the compiler check that there
// are no 'goto fail'-style elisions of important checks before we
// reach the traffic stage.
//
// These types are public, but cannot be directly constructed. This
// means their origins can be precisely determined by looking
// for their `assertion` constructors.
/// Zero-sized marker type representing verification of a signature.
#[derive(Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub struct HandshakeSignatureValid(());
impl HandshakeSignatureValid {
/// Make a `HandshakeSignatureValid`
pub fn assertion() -> Self {
Self(())
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct FinishedMessageVerified(());
impl FinishedMessageVerified {
pub(crate) fn assertion() -> Self {
Self(())
}
}
/// Zero-sized marker type representing verification of a server cert chain.
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
#[derive(Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub struct ServerCertVerified(());
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
impl ServerCertVerified {
/// Make a `ServerCertVerified`
pub fn assertion() -> Self {
Self(())
}
}
/// Zero-sized marker type representing verification of a client cert chain.
#[derive(Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub struct ClientCertVerified(());
impl ClientCertVerified {
/// Make a `ClientCertVerified`
pub fn assertion() -> Self {
Self(())
}
}
/// Something that can verify a server certificate chain, and verify
/// signatures made by certificates.
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub trait ServerCertVerifier: Send + Sync {
/// Verify the end-entity certificate `end_entity` is valid for the
/// hostname `dns_name` and chains to at least one trust anchor.
///
/// `intermediates` contains all certificates other than `end_entity` that
/// were sent as part of the server's [Certificate] message. It is in the
/// same order that the server sent them and may be empty.
///
/// Note that none of the certificates have been parsed yet, so it is the responsibility of
/// the implementor to handle invalid data. It is recommended that the implementor returns
/// [`Error::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadEncoding)`] when these cases are encountered.
///
/// `scts` contains the Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) the server
/// sent with the end-entity certificate, if any.
///
/// [Certificate]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2
fn verify_server_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
server_name: &ServerName,
scts: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = &[u8]>,
ocsp_response: &[u8],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ServerCertVerified, Error>;
/// Verify a signature allegedly by the given server certificate.
///
/// `message` is not hashed, and needs hashing during the verification.
/// The signature and algorithm are within `dss`. `cert` contains the
/// public key to use.
///
/// `cert` has already been validated by [`ServerCertVerifier::verify_server_cert`].
///
/// If and only if the signature is valid, return `Ok(HandshakeSignatureValid)`.
/// Otherwise, return an error -- rustls will send an alert and abort the
/// connection.
///
/// This method is only called for TLS1.2 handshakes. Note that, in TLS1.2,
/// SignatureSchemes such as `SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256` are not
/// in fact bound to the specific curve implied in their name.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that uses webpki to verify
/// the signature.
fn verify_tls12_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
verify_signed_struct(message, cert, dss)
}
/// Verify a signature allegedly by the given server certificate.
///
/// This method is only called for TLS1.3 handshakes.
///
/// This method is very similar to `verify_tls12_signature`: but note the
/// tighter ECDSA SignatureScheme semantics -- e.g. `SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256`
/// must only validate signatures using public keys on the right curve --
/// rustls does not enforce this requirement for you.
///
/// `cert` has already been validated by [`ServerCertVerifier::verify_server_cert`].
///
/// If and only if the signature is valid, return `Ok(HandshakeSignatureValid)`.
/// Otherwise, return an error -- rustls will send an alert and abort the
/// connection.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that uses webpki to verify
/// the signature.
fn verify_tls13_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
verify_tls13(message, cert, dss)
}
/// Return the list of SignatureSchemes that this verifier will handle,
/// in `verify_tls12_signature` and `verify_tls13_signature` calls.
///
/// This should be in priority order, with the most preferred first.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that reflects the schemes
/// supported by webpki.
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme> {
WebPkiVerifier::verification_schemes()
}
/// Returns `true` if Rustls should ask the server to send SCTs.
///
/// Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) are used for Certificate
/// Transparency validation.
///
/// The default implementation of this function returns true.
fn request_scts(&self) -> bool {
true
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for dyn ServerCertVerifier {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "dyn ServerCertVerifier")
}
}
/// Something that can verify a client certificate chain
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub trait ClientCertVerifier: Send + Sync {
/// Returns `true` to enable the server to request a client certificate and
/// `false` to skip requesting a client certificate. Defaults to `true`.
fn offer_client_auth(&self) -> bool {
true
}
/// Return `true` to require a client certificate and `false` to make
/// client authentication optional.
/// Defaults to `Some(self.offer_client_auth())`.
fn client_auth_mandatory(&self) -> bool {
self.offer_client_auth()
}
/// Returns the [Subjects] of the client authentication trust anchors to
/// share with the client when requesting client authentication.
///
/// These must be DER-encoded X.500 distinguished names, per RFC 5280.
/// They are sent in the [`certificate_authorities`] extension of a
/// [`CertificateRequest`] message.
///
/// [Subjects]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.6
/// [`CertificateRequest`]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.3.2
/// [`certificate_authorities`]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.4
///
/// If the return value is empty, no CertificateRequest message will be sent.
fn client_auth_root_subjects(&self) -> &[DistinguishedName];
/// Verify the end-entity certificate `end_entity` is valid, acceptable,
/// and chains to at least one of the trust anchors trusted by
/// this verifier.
///
/// `intermediates` contains the intermediate certificates the
/// client sent along with the end-entity certificate; it is in the same
/// order that the peer sent them and may be empty.
///
/// Note that none of the certificates have been parsed yet, so it is the responsibility of
/// the implementor to handle invalid data. It is recommended that the implementor returns
/// an [InvalidCertificate] error with the [BadEncoding] variant when these cases are encountered.
///
/// [InvalidCertificate]: Error#variant.InvalidCertificate
/// [BadEncoding]: CertificateError#variant.BadEncoding
fn verify_client_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ClientCertVerified, Error>;
/// Verify a signature allegedly by the given client certificate.
///
/// `message` is not hashed, and needs hashing during the verification.
/// The signature and algorithm are within `dss`. `cert` contains the
/// public key to use.
///
/// `cert` has already been validated by [`ClientCertVerifier::verify_client_cert`].
///
/// If and only if the signature is valid, return `Ok(HandshakeSignatureValid)`.
/// Otherwise, return an error -- rustls will send an alert and abort the
/// connection.
///
/// This method is only called for TLS1.2 handshakes. Note that, in TLS1.2,
/// SignatureSchemes such as `SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256` are not
/// in fact bound to the specific curve implied in their name.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that uses webpki to verify
/// the signature.
fn verify_tls12_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
verify_signed_struct(message, cert, dss)
}
/// Verify a signature allegedly by the given client certificate.
///
/// This method is only called for TLS1.3 handshakes.
///
/// This method is very similar to `verify_tls12_signature`, but note the
/// tighter ECDSA SignatureScheme semantics in TLS 1.3. For example,
/// `SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256`
/// must only validate signatures using public keys on the right curve --
/// rustls does not enforce this requirement for you.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that uses webpki to verify
/// the signature.
fn verify_tls13_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
verify_tls13(message, cert, dss)
}
/// Return the list of SignatureSchemes that this verifier will handle,
/// in `verify_tls12_signature` and `verify_tls13_signature` calls.
///
/// This should be in priority order, with the most preferred first.
///
/// This trait method has a default implementation that reflects the schemes
/// supported by webpki.
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme> {
WebPkiVerifier::verification_schemes()
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for dyn ClientCertVerifier {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "dyn ClientCertVerifier")
}
}
/// Verify that the end-entity certificate `end_entity` is a valid server cert
/// and chains to at least one of the [OwnedTrustAnchor] in the `roots` [RootCertStore].
///
/// `intermediates` contains all certificates other than `end_entity` that
/// were sent as part of the server's [Certificate] message. It is in the
/// same order that the server sent them and may be empty.
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "dangerous_configuration"), allow(unreachable_pub))]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub fn verify_server_cert_signed_by_trust_anchor(
cert: &ParsedCertificate,
roots: &RootCertStore,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let chain = intermediate_chain(intermediates);
let trust_roots = trust_roots(roots);
let webpki_now = webpki::Time::try_from(now).map_err(|_| Error::FailedToGetCurrentTime)?;
cert.0
.verify_for_usage(
SUPPORTED_SIG_ALGS,
&trust_roots,
&chain,
webpki_now,
webpki::KeyUsage::server_auth(),
&[], // no CRLs
)
.map_err(pki_error)
.map(|_| ())
}
/// Verify that the `end_entity` has a name or alternative name matching the `server_name`
/// note: this only verifies the name and should be used in conjuction with more verification
/// like [verify_server_cert_signed_by_trust_anchor]
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "dangerous_configuration"), allow(unreachable_pub))]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub fn verify_server_name(cert: &ParsedCertificate, server_name: &ServerName) -> Result<(), Error> {
match server_name {
ServerName::DnsName(dns_name) => {
// unlikely error because dns_name::DnsNameRef and webpki::DnsNameRef
// should have the same encoding rules.
let dns_name = webpki::DnsNameRef::try_from_ascii_str(dns_name.as_ref())
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadEncoding))?;
let name = webpki::SubjectNameRef::DnsName(dns_name);
cert.0
.verify_is_valid_for_subject_name(name)
.map_err(pki_error)?;
}
ServerName::IpAddress(ip_addr) => {
let ip_addr = webpki::IpAddr::from(*ip_addr);
cert.0
.verify_is_valid_for_subject_name(webpki::SubjectNameRef::IpAddress(
webpki::IpAddrRef::from(&ip_addr),
))
.map_err(pki_error)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
impl ServerCertVerifier for WebPkiVerifier {
/// Will verify the certificate is valid in the following ways:
/// - Signed by a trusted `RootCertStore` CA
/// - Not Expired
/// - Valid for DNS entry
fn verify_server_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
server_name: &ServerName,
scts: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = &[u8]>,
ocsp_response: &[u8],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ServerCertVerified, Error> {
let cert = ParsedCertificate::try_from(end_entity)?;
verify_server_cert_signed_by_trust_anchor(&cert, &self.roots, intermediates, now)?;
if let Some(policy) = &self.ct_policy {
policy.verify(end_entity, now, scts)?;
}
if !ocsp_response.is_empty() {
trace!("Unvalidated OCSP response: {:?}", ocsp_response.to_vec());
}
verify_server_name(&cert, server_name)?;
Ok(ServerCertVerified::assertion())
}
}
/// Default `ServerCertVerifier`, see the trait impl for more information.
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub struct WebPkiVerifier {
roots: Arc<RootCertStore>,
ct_policy: Option<CertificateTransparencyPolicy>,
}
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
impl WebPkiVerifier {
/// Constructs a new `WebPkiVerifier`.
///
/// `roots` is the set of trust anchors to trust for issuing server certs.
///
/// `ct_logs` is the list of logs that are trusted for Certificate
/// Transparency. Currently CT log enforcement is opportunistic; see
/// <https://github.com/rustls/rustls/issues/479>.
pub fn new(
roots: impl Into<Arc<RootCertStore>>,
ct_policy: Option<CertificateTransparencyPolicy>,
) -> Self {
Self {
roots: roots.into(),
ct_policy,
}
}
/// Returns the signature verification methods supported by
/// webpki.
pub fn verification_schemes() -> Vec<SignatureScheme> {
vec![
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::ED25519,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
]
}
}
/// Policy for enforcing Certificate Transparency.
///
/// Because Certificate Transparency logs are sharded on a per-year basis and can be trusted or
/// distrusted relatively quickly, rustls stores a validation deadline. Server certificates will
/// be validated against the configured CT logs until the deadline expires. After the deadline,
/// certificates will no longer be validated, and a warning message will be logged. The deadline
/// may vary depending on how often you deploy builds with updated dependencies.
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "dangerous_configuration")))]
pub struct CertificateTransparencyPolicy {
logs: &'static [&'static sct::Log<'static>],
validation_deadline: SystemTime,
}
impl CertificateTransparencyPolicy {
/// Create a new policy.
#[allow(unreachable_pub)]
pub fn new(
logs: &'static [&'static sct::Log<'static>],
validation_deadline: SystemTime,
) -> Self {
Self {
logs,
validation_deadline,
}
}
fn verify(
&self,
cert: &Certificate,
now: SystemTime,
scts: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = &[u8]>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.logs.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
} else if self
.validation_deadline
.duration_since(now)
.is_err()
{
warn!("certificate transparency logs have expired, validation disabled");
return Ok(());
}
let now = unix_time_millis(now)?;
let mut last_sct_error = None;
for sct in scts {
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "logging"), allow(unused_variables))]
match sct::verify_sct(&cert.0, sct, now, self.logs) {
Ok(index) => {
debug!(
"Valid SCT signed by {} on {}",
self.logs[index].operated_by, self.logs[index].description
);
return Ok(());
}
Err(e) => {
if e.should_be_fatal() {
return Err(Error::InvalidSct(e));
}
debug!("SCT ignored because {:?}", e);
last_sct_error = Some(e);
}
}
}
/* If we were supplied with some logs, and some SCTs,
* but couldn't verify any of them, fail the handshake. */
if let Some(last_sct_error) = last_sct_error {
warn!("No valid SCTs provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidSct(last_sct_error));
}
Ok(())
}
}
fn intermediate_chain(intermediates: &[Certificate]) -> Vec<&[u8]> {
intermediates
.iter()
.map(|cert| cert.0.as_ref())
.collect()
}
fn trust_roots(roots: &RootCertStore) -> Vec<webpki::TrustAnchor> {
roots
.roots
.iter()
.map(OwnedTrustAnchor::to_trust_anchor)
.collect()
}
/// An unparsed DER encoded Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
pub struct UnparsedCertRevocationList(pub Vec<u8>);
impl UnparsedCertRevocationList {
/// Parse the CRL DER, yielding a [`webpki::CertRevocationList`] or an error if the CRL
/// is malformed, or uses unsupported features.
pub fn parse(&self) -> Result<webpki::OwnedCertRevocationList, CertRevocationListError> {
webpki::BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der(&self.0)
.and_then(|crl| crl.to_owned())
.map_err(CertRevocationListError::from)
}
}
/// A `ClientCertVerifier` that will ensure that every client provides a trusted
/// certificate, without any name checking. Optionally, client certificates will
/// have their revocation status checked using the DER encoded CRLs provided.
pub struct AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient {
roots: RootCertStore,
subjects: Vec<DistinguishedName>,
crls: Vec<webpki::OwnedCertRevocationList>,
}
impl AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient {
/// Construct a new `AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient`.
///
/// `roots` is the list of trust anchors to use for certificate validation.
pub fn new(roots: RootCertStore) -> Self {
Self {
subjects: roots
.roots
.iter()
.map(|r| r.subject().clone())
.collect(),
crls: Vec::new(),
roots,
}
}
/// Update the verifier to validate client certificates against the provided DER format
/// unparsed certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
pub fn with_crls(
self,
crls: impl IntoIterator<Item = UnparsedCertRevocationList>,
) -> Result<Self, CertRevocationListError> {
Ok(Self {
crls: crls
.into_iter()
.map(|der_crl| der_crl.parse())
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, CertRevocationListError>>()?,
..self
})
}
/// Wrap this verifier in an [`Arc`] and coerce it to `dyn ClientCertVerifier`
#[inline(always)]
pub fn boxed(self) -> Arc<dyn ClientCertVerifier> {
// This function is needed because `ClientCertVerifier` is only reachable if the
// `dangerous_configuration` feature is enabled, which makes coercing hard to outside users
Arc::new(self)
}
}
impl ClientCertVerifier for AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient {
fn offer_client_auth(&self) -> bool {
true
}
fn client_auth_root_subjects(&self) -> &[DistinguishedName] {
&self.subjects
}
fn verify_client_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ClientCertVerified, Error> {
let cert = ParsedCertificate::try_from(end_entity)?;
let chain = intermediate_chain(intermediates);
let trust_roots = trust_roots(&self.roots);
let now = webpki::Time::try_from(now).map_err(|_| Error::FailedToGetCurrentTime)?;
#[allow(trivial_casts)] // Cast to &dyn trait is required.
let crls = self
.crls
.iter()
.map(|crl| crl as &dyn webpki::CertRevocationList)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
cert.0
.verify_for_usage(
SUPPORTED_SIG_ALGS,
&trust_roots,
&chain,
now,
webpki::KeyUsage::client_auth(),
crls.as_slice(),
)
.map_err(pki_error)
.map(|_| ClientCertVerified::assertion())
}
}
/// A `ClientCertVerifier` that will allow both anonymous and authenticated
/// clients, without any name checking.
///
/// Client authentication will be requested during the TLS handshake. If the
/// client offers a certificate then this acts like
/// `AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient`, otherwise this acts like `NoClientAuth`.
pub struct AllowAnyAnonymousOrAuthenticatedClient {
inner: AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient,
}
impl AllowAnyAnonymousOrAuthenticatedClient {
/// Construct a new `AllowAnyAnonymousOrAuthenticatedClient`.
///
/// `roots` is the list of trust anchors to use for certificate validation.
pub fn new(roots: RootCertStore) -> Self {
Self {
inner: AllowAnyAuthenticatedClient::new(roots),
}
}
/// Update the verifier to validate client certificates against the provided DER format
/// unparsed certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
pub fn with_crls(
self,
crls: impl IntoIterator<Item = UnparsedCertRevocationList>,
) -> Result<Self, CertRevocationListError> {
Ok(Self {
inner: self.inner.with_crls(crls)?,
})
}
/// Wrap this verifier in an [`Arc`] and coerce it to `dyn ClientCertVerifier`
#[inline(always)]
pub fn boxed(self) -> Arc<dyn ClientCertVerifier> {
// This function is needed because `ClientCertVerifier` is only reachable if the
// `dangerous_configuration` feature is enabled, which makes coercing hard to outside users
Arc::new(self)
}
}
impl ClientCertVerifier for AllowAnyAnonymousOrAuthenticatedClient {
fn offer_client_auth(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.offer_client_auth()
}
fn client_auth_mandatory(&self) -> bool {
false
}
fn client_auth_root_subjects(&self) -> &[DistinguishedName] {
self.inner.client_auth_root_subjects()
}
fn verify_client_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &Certificate,
intermediates: &[Certificate],
now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ClientCertVerified, Error> {
self.inner
.verify_client_cert(end_entity, intermediates, now)
}
}
pub(crate) fn pki_error(error: webpki::Error) -> Error {
use webpki::Error::*;
match error {
BadDer | BadDerTime => CertificateError::BadEncoding.into(),
CertNotValidYet => CertificateError::NotValidYet.into(),
CertExpired | InvalidCertValidity => CertificateError::Expired.into(),
UnknownIssuer => CertificateError::UnknownIssuer.into(),
CertNotValidForName => CertificateError::NotValidForName.into(),
CertRevoked => CertificateError::Revoked.into(),
IssuerNotCrlSigner => CertRevocationListError::IssuerInvalidForCrl.into(),
InvalidSignatureForPublicKey
| UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm
| UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKey => CertificateError::BadSignature.into(),
InvalidCrlSignatureForPublicKey
| UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithm
| UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKey => {
CertRevocationListError::BadSignature.into()
}
_ => CertificateError::Other(Arc::new(error)).into(),
}
}
/// Turns off client authentication.
pub struct NoClientAuth;
impl NoClientAuth {
/// Construct a [`NoClientAuth`], wrap it in an [`Arc`] and coerce it to
/// `dyn ClientCertVerifier`.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn boxed() -> Arc<dyn ClientCertVerifier> {
// This function is needed because `ClientCertVerifier` is only reachable if the
// `dangerous_configuration` feature is enabled, which makes coercing hard to outside users
Arc::new(Self)
}
}
impl ClientCertVerifier for NoClientAuth {
fn offer_client_auth(&self) -> bool {
false
}
fn client_auth_root_subjects(&self) -> &[DistinguishedName] {
unimplemented!();
}
fn verify_client_cert(
&self,
_end_entity: &Certificate,
_intermediates: &[Certificate],
_now: SystemTime,
) -> Result<ClientCertVerified, Error> {
unimplemented!();
}
}
/// This type combines a [`SignatureScheme`] and a signature payload produced with that scheme.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct DigitallySignedStruct {
/// The [`SignatureScheme`] used to produce the signature.
pub scheme: SignatureScheme,
sig: PayloadU16,
}
impl DigitallySignedStruct {
pub(crate) fn new(scheme: SignatureScheme, sig: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
Self {
scheme,
sig: PayloadU16::new(sig),
}
}
/// Get the signature.
pub fn signature(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.sig.0
}
}
impl Codec for DigitallySignedStruct {
fn encode(&self, bytes: &mut Vec<u8>) {
self.scheme.encode(bytes);
self.sig.encode(bytes);
}
fn read(r: &mut Reader) -> Result<Self, InvalidMessage> {
let scheme = SignatureScheme::read(r)?;
let sig = PayloadU16::read(r)?;
Ok(Self { scheme, sig })
}
}
static ECDSA_SHA256: SignatureAlgorithms =
&[&webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA256, &webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA256];
static ECDSA_SHA384: SignatureAlgorithms =
&[&webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA384, &webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA384];
static ED25519: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::ED25519];
static RSA_SHA256: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256];
static RSA_SHA384: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384];
static RSA_SHA512: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512];
static RSA_PSS_SHA256: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY];
static RSA_PSS_SHA384: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY];
static RSA_PSS_SHA512: SignatureAlgorithms = &[&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY];
fn convert_scheme(scheme: SignatureScheme) -> Result<SignatureAlgorithms, Error> {
match scheme {
// nb. for TLS1.2 the curve is not fixed by SignatureScheme.
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => Ok(ECDSA_SHA256),
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => Ok(ECDSA_SHA384),
SignatureScheme::ED25519 => Ok(ED25519),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => Ok(RSA_SHA256),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 => Ok(RSA_SHA384),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => Ok(RSA_SHA512),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => Ok(RSA_PSS_SHA256),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384 => Ok(RSA_PSS_SHA384),
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => Ok(RSA_PSS_SHA512),
_ => Err(PeerMisbehaved::SignedHandshakeWithUnadvertisedSigScheme.into()),
}
}
fn verify_sig_using_any_alg(
cert: &webpki::EndEntityCert,
algs: SignatureAlgorithms,
message: &[u8],
sig: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), webpki::Error> {
// TLS doesn't itself give us enough info to map to a single webpki::SignatureAlgorithm.
// Therefore, convert_algs maps to several and we try them all.
for alg in algs {
match cert.verify_signature(alg, message, sig) {
Err(webpki::Error::UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKey) => continue,
res => return res,
}
}
Err(webpki::Error::UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKey)
}
fn verify_signed_struct(
message: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
let possible_algs = convert_scheme(dss.scheme)?;
let cert = webpki::EndEntityCert::try_from(cert.0.as_ref()).map_err(pki_error)?;
verify_sig_using_any_alg(&cert, possible_algs, message, dss.signature())
.map_err(pki_error)
.map(|_| HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
}
fn convert_alg_tls13(
scheme: SignatureScheme,
) -> Result<&'static webpki::SignatureAlgorithm, Error> {
use crate::enums::SignatureScheme::*;
match scheme {
ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => Ok(&webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA256),
ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => Ok(&webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA384),
ED25519 => Ok(&webpki::ED25519),
RSA_PSS_SHA256 => Ok(&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY),
RSA_PSS_SHA384 => Ok(&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY),
RSA_PSS_SHA512 => Ok(&webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY),
_ => Err(PeerMisbehaved::SignedHandshakeWithUnadvertisedSigScheme.into()),
}
}
/// Constructs the signature message specified in section 4.4.3 of RFC8446.
pub(crate) fn construct_tls13_client_verify_message(handshake_hash: &Digest) -> Vec<u8> {
construct_tls13_verify_message(handshake_hash, b"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00")
}
/// Constructs the signature message specified in section 4.4.3 of RFC8446.
pub(crate) fn construct_tls13_server_verify_message(handshake_hash: &Digest) -> Vec<u8> {
construct_tls13_verify_message(handshake_hash, b"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00")
}
fn construct_tls13_verify_message(
handshake_hash: &Digest,
context_string_with_0: &[u8],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut msg = Vec::new();
msg.resize(64, 0x20u8);
msg.extend_from_slice(context_string_with_0);
msg.extend_from_slice(handshake_hash.as_ref());
msg
}
fn verify_tls13(
msg: &[u8],
cert: &Certificate,
dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
let alg = convert_alg_tls13(dss.scheme)?;
let cert = webpki::EndEntityCert::try_from(cert.0.as_ref()).map_err(pki_error)?;
cert.verify_signature(alg, msg, dss.signature())
.map_err(pki_error)
.map(|_| HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
}
fn unix_time_millis(now: SystemTime) -> Result<u64, Error> {
now.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|dur| dur.as_secs())
.map_err(|_| Error::FailedToGetCurrentTime)
.and_then(|secs| {
secs.checked_mul(1000)
.ok_or(Error::FailedToGetCurrentTime)
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn assertions_are_debug() {
assert_eq!(
format!("{:?}", ClientCertVerified::assertion()),
"ClientCertVerified(())"
);
assert_eq!(
format!("{:?}", HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion()),
"HandshakeSignatureValid(())"
);
assert_eq!(
format!("{:?}", FinishedMessageVerified::assertion()),
"FinishedMessageVerified(())"
);
assert_eq!(
format!("{:?}", ServerCertVerified::assertion()),
"ServerCertVerified(())"
);
}
#[test]
fn pki_crl_errors() {
// CRL signature errors should be turned into BadSignature.
assert_eq!(
pki_error(webpki::Error::InvalidCrlSignatureForPublicKey),
Error::InvalidCertRevocationList(CertRevocationListError::BadSignature),
);
assert_eq!(
pki_error(webpki::Error::UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithm),
Error::InvalidCertRevocationList(CertRevocationListError::BadSignature),
);
assert_eq!(
pki_error(webpki::Error::UnsupportedCrlSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKey),
Error::InvalidCertRevocationList(CertRevocationListError::BadSignature),
);
// Revoked cert errors should be turned into Revoked.
assert_eq!(
pki_error(webpki::Error::CertRevoked),
Error::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::Revoked),
);
// Issuer not CRL signer errors should be turned into IssuerInvalidForCrl
assert_eq!(
pki_error(webpki::Error::IssuerNotCrlSigner),
Error::InvalidCertRevocationList(CertRevocationListError::IssuerInvalidForCrl)
);
}
}